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ON HASKER'S DEFENSE OF ANTI-MOLIN ISM 
William Lane Craig 
In a pair of recent articles, William Hasker has attempted to defend Robert 
Adams's new anti-Molinist argument. But I argue that the sense of explanatory 
priority operative in the argument is either equivocal or, if a univocal sense can 
be given to it, it is either so generic that we should have to deny its transitivity 
or so weak that it would not be incompatible with human freedom. 
In a pair of recent articles! William Hasker has endorsed and defended 
Robert Adams's new anti-Molinist argumenf: 
1. According to Molinism, the truth of all true counterfactuals of free-
dom about us is explanatorily prior to God's decision to create us. 
2. God's decision to create us is explanatorily prior to our existence. 
3. Our existence is explanatorily prior to all of our choices and actions. 
4. The relation of explanatory priority is transitive. 
5. Therefore it follows from Molinism (by 1-4) that the truth of all 
true counterfactuals of freedom about us is explanatorily prior to 
all of our choices and actions. 
10. It follows also from Molinism that if I freely do action A in cir-
cumstances C, then there is a true counterfactual of freedom P, 
which says that if I were in C, then I would (freely) do A. 
11. Therefore, it follows from Molinism that if I freely do A in C, 
the truth of F* is explanatorily prior to my choosing and acting as I 
do in C. 
12. If I freely do A in C, no truth that is strictly inconsistent with 
my refraining from A in C is explanatorily prior to my choosing 
and acting as I do in C. 
13. The truth of F* (which says that if I were in C, then I would do 
A) is strictly inconsistent with my refraining from A in C. 
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14. If Molinism is true, then if I freely do A in C, F* both is (by 11) 
and is not (by 12-13) explanatorily prior to my choosing and acting 
as I do in C. 
15. Therefore, (by 14) if Molinism is true, then I do not freely do A 
in C. 
Hasker likes this argument because it has the advantage of avoiding 
reliance on one of the most controversial premisses of his own critique 
of middle knowledge; moreover, he considers it immune to objections 
which have been lodged against it. 
In response to Adams's argument, I had complained that the notion 
of "explanatory priority" employed is equivocal and that if a univocal 
sense can be given it, there is no reason to expect it to be transitive.3 I 
maintained that none of the senses of "explanatory priority" operative in 
(1)-(3) have application to the peculiar priority inferred in (5). I offered 
the following parallel argument as an illustration: suppose my wife and 
I are considering starting a family and that we come to believe that 
A.* If children were born to us, they would come to love God. 
Since this is important to us, we decide to start a family. Accordingly, 
1 *. The truth of (A *) is explanatorily prior to our decision to have 
children. 
It is also undeniably true that 
2*. Our decision to have children is explanatorily prior to the exis-
tence of our children. 
3*. Our children's existence is explanatorily prior to their coming 
to love God. 
So if (4) is true, we must conclude that 
5*. The truth of (A *) is explanatorily prior to our children's coming 
to love God. 
But the sense of explanatory priority in (5*) is utterly obscure. 
Hasker defends Adams's argument against the charge of eguivocity 
by enunciating a very broad conception of explanatory priority which is 
univocal in (1)-(3) and yet transitive: for contingent states of affairs p 
and q, 
EP: p is explanatorily prior to q iff P must be included in a com-
plete explanation of why q obtains 
Hasker asserts, "It should be apparent that explanatory priority as expli-
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cated by (EP) is transitive: if p is explanatorily prior to q, and q to r, then 
clearly p must be included in a complete explanation of why r obtains."4 
But this is not at all clear. As Hasker observes, such a relation must also 
be irreflexive: "a contingent state of affairs cannot constitute an explana-
tion (in whole or in part) of itself."s But if the relation described by (EP) 
is transitive, then it seems that the condition of irreflexivity is violated. 
My wife and I not infrequently find ourselves in the situation that I want 
to do something if she wants to do it, and she wants to do it if I want to 
do it. Suppose, then, that John is going to the party because Mary is 
going, and Mary is going to the party because John is going. It follows 
that if the (EP) relation is transitive, John is going to the party because 
John is going to the party, which conclusion is obviously wrong. Not 
only is such a conclusion explanatorily vacuous, but it also implies, in 
conjunction with (12), that John does not freely go to the party-the very 
conclusion Hasker wants to avoid.6 
Hasker also rebuts my counter-example based on (A*), noting that 
what is explanatorily prior to our decision is merely our (fallible) belief 
that (A *) is true. But the disanalogy noted by Hasker is not an essential 
part of the illustration. My aim was to construct a parallel to Adams's 
0)-(5) in which we as pro-creators take God's place as Creator and our 
children take our place as the products of (pro-)creation. (A *) is then 
explanatorily prior to our decision in the same way that counterfactuals 
of creaturely freedom are explanatorily prior to God's decision. It is 
incidental to the issue of the transitivity and equivocity of explanatory 
priority whether our belief that (A *) is knowledge or infallible; if 
desired, we can stipulate that we acquired such knowledge via the psy-
chic hotline or a prophetic word from God. Thus, the illustration suc-
ceeds in showing the equivocity of Adams's argument or the intransitiv-
ity of the explanatory priority involved. 
Now, of course, in a certain sense the Molinist agrees that the truth of 
all true counterfactuals of freedom about us is explanatorily prior to all 
of our choices and actions, as (5) states, though this does not follow from 
0)-(4). For presumably the divine creative decree was guided by God's 
knowledge of true counterfactuals of creaturely freedom. But I also 
argued that Adams's (2) is false, first, because it represents the falla-
cious reasoning of fatalism and, second, because my being able to refrain 
from doing A in C is not a necessary condition of my freely doing A in 
C, so that the argument is unsound. 
In his "Middle Knowledge: a Refutation Revisited," Hasker endorses 
Adams's (12)/ but he fails to respond to my two criticisms of it. Instead, 
he attempts to formulate an explication of "brings about" which is 
equivalent to his favored Power Entailment Principle.s That principle is 
vital to his inference that if one can bring it about that A & -B, then one 
can bring it about that A 0" -B, which Hasker claims to have proven 
impossible. Unfortunately, Hasker has yet to answer either my intuitive 
objections to his principle9 or my counter-examples to it. lO If we accept 
my proposed alternative 
PEP's: If it is in S's power to bring it about that P, and "P" entails 
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"Q" and "Q" is false, and Q is a consequence of P, then it is in S's 
power to bring it about that Q 
then, plausibly, AD-+ -B is not a consequence of A & -B, and so one's 
bringing about the latter does not entail that one brings about the for-
mer. Suppose, for example, that I hear a knock at the door and go to 
answer it. Then it is true that if I were to hear a knock at the door, I 
should go answer it. But the truth of that counterfactual is surely not a 
consequence of my actual actions, for even if I am asleep and so fail to 
hear the knock and answer the door, it may well still be true that if I 
were to hear a knock at the door, I should go answer it. So in the case at 
hand, my putative inability to bring about AD-+ -B does not entail my 
inability to bring about A & -B. 
Even if the Molinist simply concedes the truth of (5) in the sense of 
explanatory priority explicated in Hasker's (EP), that notion is so weak 
that (12) is all the more obviously false. For counterfactuals concerning 
our free actions may be explanatorily prior to those actions in Hasker's 
sense only because God's reason for creating us may have been in part 
that He knew we should freely do such things. But it is wholly mysteri-
ous how this sense of explanatory priority is incompatible with our per-
forming such actions freely. In a footnote to his second piece, Hasker 
claims that Adams's argument can be freed from reliance on (12), refer-
ring the reader to his own argument against middle knowledge. l1 But 
the duly attentive reader will find in that discussion nothing but a reiter-
ation of Hasker's previous argument on this score with no refutation of 
the several objections lodged against it in the literatureY 
Thus, it seems to me that neither Adams nor Hasker has been able to 
explicate a sense of explanatory priority with respect to the truth of 
counterfactuals of creaturely freedom which is both transitive and inimi-
cal to human freedom. Either the notion of "explanatory priority" as it 
plays a role in the argument is equivocal or, if a univocal sense can be 
given to it, any such notion is either so generic that we should have to 
deny its transitivity or so weak that it would not be inimical to human 
freedom. 
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